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Modern enterprises system features the seperation of enterprise ownership and its 
management.In modern erterprise system,shareholders consign the management to 
executives,then executives function as the agents of sharehoders in contract 
arrangement.As the target function of executives is different with 
shareholders’,executives may maximize their own benefits at the expense of 
shareholders’.As the incentive scheme to solve Client-Agent problems between 
shareholders and executives,executive stock option(ESO) is a contradiction since its 
emergence:ESO can solve Client-Agent problems to a certain extent,but itself is also 
becoming part of Client-Agent problems. 
A series of finance scandal broken out in the recent yuears in America make people 
know that the improper accounting treatment for ESO leave the very big space to 
manager carry on accountancy forging. In addition,the improper accounting treatment 
for ESO drives shareholders,board members and executives to falsely perceive stock 
options to be inexpensive,then causes serious distortion on the frame and format of 
the incentive contract.Thus,the research on the accounting treatment for ESO can be 
helpful to control earnings manipulation,mitigate the agent costs,improve the 
information quality of the financial reports,and maximize shareholder benefits.For 
ESO started lately in China and the related accounting principles are not perfect,the 
paper have its meaning in practice.  
  The acconting treatment for ESO mainly includes the recognition,measurement and 
report of stock option.This paper throws light on the measurement of ESO：Directed 
by the modern theory, using standard method and case study method,combined with 
existed achievements about theoretical researches and practice activities of ESO 
accounting in the world, this paper researches the measurement of ESO,and follows 
the new development trend in the whole world,in order to make suggestions to perfect 
ESO accounting principles of China.  
  There are five chapters altogether.Chapter One introduces the subject 
selection,research scope and mathod and innovation and deficiency of this 
paper.Chapter Two analyses the Client-Agent theory,then points out the economic 
essential and business behave of ESO.As the main bodies of this paper,Chapter Three 
and Four analyse the measurement object of ESO basing on the economic essential 
and business behave of ESO,then discuss the measurement attribute,measurement 
methods and Measurement Date of ESO,whose interrelationship is also studied in 
these chapters.Chapter Five is the conclusion of this paper.It also points out the 
research meaning both in accounting theory and practice.The appendix is a case study 
on a chinese listed company.Combining the accounting theory and practice,throungh 
this case,the paper points out something which need to be improved on in share-based 
payment accounting. 
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第 1 章 导论 







看法是在 1952 年，一家名为 PFIZER 的美国公司首先推行了经理人股票期权计
划。但该公司的目的在于避税，寄望经理人股票期权在税率较低时实现利得，
而不是将其作为减少股东和经理人间代理成本的激励工具。无论如何，直至 20
世纪 90 年代，美国公司经理人股票期权的使用才开始风行。据统计，到 20 世
纪 90 年代末，《财富》500 强中 90％以上的公司都对其高级经理人员采取了经
理人股票期权激励计划①，经理人股票期权报酬占经理人总报酬的比重从 20 世
纪 80 年代中期的 1/5 上升到了 20 世纪 90 年代中期的 1/3（Hall and Liebman，
1998；Murphy，1999）。到 1998 年，经理人股票期权报酬占其总报酬的比重为










                                                        
① “Don’t Throw Out Options Because Investors Took A Bath”，Businss Week. Apr 29，2002，转引自谢德仁． 经
理人激励与股票期权，2004 年，第 40 页。 














- 2 - 
出现了大量的争议，尤以美国高科技公司①的意见为甚。甚至有学者认为，哪怕
把股票期权说成是 FASB 曾经处理过的 富有争议的问题，仍然还是低估了它
（Minter2002）②。FASB（1995）在 SFAS No.123 的附录 A、C 中对准则制订过
程的争议做了描述，在 SFAS No.123（revised 2004）的附录 A 中则对从 APB
于 1972 年的 25 号意见书开始至 2004 年准则修订稿颁布之间的过程做了描述。 










随意性较大。在股票分置改革的背景下，中国证监会于 2005 年 12 月颁布了《上










                                                        
① 这类公司往往有较高的股票期权费用。 
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2． 本文对 FASB 在 SFAS No.157——公允价值计量做了介绍，并指出了国


































1932 年，Berle 和 Means 指出，公司的股票持有者与公司经理的角色是很
不同的。公司经理人是在经营企业并做出决策；而公司股东则在对公司拥有剩





























第 2 章 经理人股票期权的理论解析――基于委托代理理论 



























说，经理人股票期权的时间安排如图 2－1 所示： 
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